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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Louella R. Switzer Bowles, widow of Gordon Switzer, filed suit on behalf of 
herself and the five minor children of Gordon Switzer, seeking damages and recovery 
for the wrongful death of Gordon Switzer, pursuant to Section 78-11-7 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 (as amended). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted the motion of Defendant Reynolds and dismissed the 
action on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired prior to the 
filing of the suit. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Decedent Gordon Switzer, while in the course of his employment on June 24, 
1963, was involved in an accident which resulted in his death. On July 5, 1963, 
his widow , Louella R. Switzer, now known as Louella R. Bowles, filed an Application 
for Hearing to settle Industrial Claims with the Utah State Industrial Commission. 
The application was tiled by her on behalf of the minor children who were named 
in the application. No recovery was ever granted to Mrs. Bowles and the children 
by the Industrial Commission. The complaint in the case was filed on October 31, 
1974. 
The hearing on Reynolds Motion to Dismiss was limited to the issue of whether 
or not the statute of limitations had expired prior to the filing of the suit. Arguments 
were limited to this issue and the court decided the motion m this issue. No 
evidence has yet been entered into the record on the issues of discharge in bank-
ruptcy or negligence and workman 1 s compensation coverage. It is therefore Respon-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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dent's contention that the points in Appellant's brief relating to these collateral 
issues are not germaine to the controlling issue on appeal; that is, whether or not 
the statute of limitations bars Appellants cause of action. 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT REYNOLDS PROPERLY RAISED THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS AS A DEFENSE TO APPELLANTS' CLAIMS. 
Appellants contend that Respondent Reynolds has not cited the appropriate 
statutory section of the Utah code § 78-12-28, in his answer, and therefore, cannot 
rely on the defense on appeal. It is true that the answer filed by Reynolds does~· 
forth, in the third defense, that plaintiff's action is barred by Section 70A-12-28, 
Utah Code Annotated, but it is evident for three reasons that the section was theN 
of clerical error. First, there is and has not ever been a Section 70A-12-28, in th! 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Title 70A deals with the Uniform Commercial Code ano 
ends with chapter 11. Secondly, the answer of Reynolds specifically states thattt 
action is barred "In that the action was not commenced within two years." Thiri 
Respondent properly cited §78-12-28 in a Motion to Dismiss, which was the first 
pleading he filed, and which gave Appellant timely notice of this defense. It thm 
fore becomes obvious that in transcribing dictation, the words "seventy-eight" we: 
mistaken for "seventy-A". 
The argument of Appellants implies that Respondent Reynolds relied on an 
inappropriate Statute of Limitations, citing several cases in support thereof. Th€ 
Utah cases cited are not applicable or controlling as their facts are easily distingu:' 
from those of the present case. In Tanner vs. Provo Reservoir Co. , 78 Utah !)I 
2P. 2d 107, (1931), the defendants did not raise any issue as to the statute of JirniL 
tions until the time of appeal. The court's opinion does not state that any specific 
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statute must be pleaded, but indicates only that the defense of the statute of limita-
tions must be pleaded, or will not be available. The language, in fact, implies that 
the defense is not absolutely waived. The court suggests that if the defendants 
claimed that the plaintiff's right was barred by the statute of limitations, "they 
should be permitted to amend their pleadings so as to raise those issues" at 111. 
In Utah-Delaware Mining Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 76 Utah 187, 289 P.94 (1930) 
the court set forth the general rule that a party can rely on a statute of limitations 
as defense only where he pleads it at the first opportunity. The facts of that case 
showed a defendant mining company which did not raise the issue of statute of 
limitations until a re-hearing was not allowed to plead the defense. The court 
noted that the defendant had sufficient prior opportunity to raise his defense, held 
that it had been waived and did not permit the issue to be interposed at the re-hearing. 
In the present case the Respondent Reynolds not only raised the statute of limitations 
in his answer of January 1975, but also plead the statute at his first opportunity in 
a Motion to Dismiss, filed in November of 197 4. 
American Theater Co. vs. Glassman, 95 utah 303, 80 P. 2d, 922 (1938) in-
volved two possible statute of limitations. The respondent intentionally chose to 
sue under one Section of the Utah Code, while the court agreed that another Code 
Section was the proper under which suit should be instituted. This case involved 
a mistake of law in suing under an inappropriate statute of limitations, and did not 
involve a mistake of fact, such as the typographical error in the present case. 
Wasatch Mines Co. vs. William Hokinson, 465 P. 2d 1007 (utah 1970) did hold that 
a particular defendant improperly pleaded the statute of limitations, but the facts are 
not clear as to whether defendant attempted to cite any section of the utah Code or not. 
The language of the opinion, leads one to believe that the defendant merely pleaded 
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the statute of limitations in a general manner and did not designate anv secti . 
· on 01 
statute or statutes upon which he relied. Furthermore, the opinion does not talk 
about the necessity of stating a sub-section of the code. As Respondent Reynolds 
set forth the section upon which he relied in his Motion to Dismiss, he has compliE 
with the specificity ordered by Rule 9 (h). 
Appellants further allege that equitable estoppel is proper in the present 
situation to prevent Respondent Reynolds from relying on the statute of limitations 
Appellants state that throughout three years of discovery and hearing, neither 
defendant acted to have the complaint dismissed for the running of statute of limit· 
Appellants Brief, page 10. In actuality, Respondent Reynolds filed a Motion to Di: 
in November of 1974, setting forth the grounds that the action "was not commencec 
within two years as required by 78-12-28, Utah Code Annotated, 1953". This mot 
of Reynolds was filed prior to his answer and almost immediately upon receipt of 
the complaint from plaintiff. On December 10, 197 4, Respondent's Motion was 
argued before the Honorable Steward M. Hanson, Jr. Plaintifr s counsel was pm 
and participated therein, and the Courts Amended Order provided that plaintiffs 
complaint be dismissed unless plaintiff amended the complaint to allege facts relati: 
to the tolling of the statute of limitations . Defendant Reynolds has at no time take: 
any action which would constitute a waiver or abandonment of this defense, or an' 
action upon which plaintiff could rely so as to justify a case for estopp. 
If estoppel is at all proper in this case, it should be applied against plainti'. 
who has not raised the mistaken designation of the statute of limitations in plaintif 
answer until the appeal proceeding. Respondent Clark has discussed the applies: 
of estoppel against Appellant in great detail under Point II of its brief, which ana 
and conclusion Respondent Reynolds concurs in as a correct statement of the la~ 
equitable principles involved. 
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POINT II 
THERE IS ONLY ONE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR A WRONGFUL 
DEATH CLAIM AND SUIT ON THAT CAUSE IS BARRED BY 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOUND AT §78-12-28(2) 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
Plaintiffs Complaint is brought pursuant to § 78-11- 7, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. The relevant provisions of this section state that: 
When the death of a person not a minor is caused by the 
wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs or his personal 
representative for the benefit of his heirs, may maintain an 
action for damages against the person causing the death ... 
The statute of limitations controlling the time for bringing suit on the single 
cause of action for wrongful death is found at § 78-12-28, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
This section provides that suit must be commenced within two years if it is an action 
to recover damages for the death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another. An additional statute, §78-12-36, must be consulted in the present litigation 
to correctly determine the effect of §78-12-28. Section 78-12-36 was enacted to 
protect the claims of those under certain disabilities, including infancy, from the 
regular statutes of limitations. It states that: 
If a person entitled to bring an action other than for the 
recovery of real property is at the time of the cause of action ... 
under the age of majority ... the time of such disability is not 
part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. 
Though the two-year limitation on recovery for wrongful death does not mention 
which disability, if any, tolls its running, plaintiffs assert that §78-12-36 allows 
minority to effectively toll the two-year statute and preserve all of the plaintiffs' 
claims for a period of two years subsequent to the date that the youngest child 
reaches her majority. This is not the rule of law governing this case. 
Though the disability statute only speaks in terms of minority, Utah cases 
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have imposed a further qualification on this particular disability. In order for 
statutes of limitations to be tolled during minority, the infant and his interests 
must not be represented by an adult administrator, official guardian or genera] 
guardian. This judicial development springs from the court's continued concern 
with balancing two competing interests, i.e. , the policy of protecting the legal 
rights of infants, and the policy favoring a timely resolution of legal disputes. Ir: 
Louisville and R.R. Co. vs. Sanders, 5 S. W. 564 (Ky 188 7) , a Kentucky court, 
in construing a wrongful death statute and limitations similar to the Utah statutes. 
explained that: 
The statutory savings on behalf of the infant is only intended 
to apply where there is no one in being who has power to sue. Unle; 
this construction is given it, the statute of limitations is not one of 
repose, as the cause of action may be kept alive for over 20 years, 
although there is no one in being, during the entire time who has 
the right to sue. Sanders, supra, at 565 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the Sanders reasoning in Platz vs. Internationi 
Smelting Co., 61 Utah 342, 213 Pac. 187 (1922), and indicated that the statutefor 
recovery on wrongful death would run if a widow , heir or personal representativ 
existed and could have sued. The Court stated: 
The great weight of authority, if not the unanimous authority, 
supports the argument of respondent to the effect that the statute 
of limitations begins to run against the right of action immediately 
after the death ... Platz, supra, at 188. 
It is evident that the statute of limitations assumes that an action should be 
brought only when there is a proper party who is in existence and competent tos 
Therefore, the availability of a protecting adult will qualify the general rule that 
minority may toll a statute of limitations. Once such a proper party is present. t 
is of the essence and the right and remedy is lost if not pursued. ~ Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Richards, 119U.S. 199, 301.Ed. 258 (1886). In Sanders, supra, the court disallowed 
::.:...--
the later suit of a minor on the following grounds: 
When the administrator qualified, there was a person in 
esse who had the right to sue and recover and receive the entire 
damages, leaving in existence the cause of action. The statute 
then began to run, not only against him but against the cause of 
action ... (P .565) 
Another Utah case mirrored the Sanders reasoning in holding that failure of 
an administrator, who was also the heirs' guardian, to sue within the period of 
limitations, es topped the minor from later suing on his own behalf. Dignan vs. 
Nelson, 26 Utah 186, 72 Pac. 936 (1903). 
In addition to appointments of administrators, the mere presence of a general 
guardian will prevent a minor's infancy from tolling the statute of limitations. In 
Utah, parents are automatically designated as guardians for their children. § 75-13-18 
of the guardianship chapter of the Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) provides 
that: 
Husband and wife living together are joint guardians of their 
minor children, with equal powers , rights and duties with respect 
to the control and custody and services and earnings of their minor 
children ... 
This section states that parents are guardians of their children, which status 
allows the parent to sue under the wrongful death statute found at §78-11-7 Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. When neither parent is alive, the court may appoint a 
guardian for minors as authorized in § 75-13-12, for necessity or convenience. 
But no such appointment is necessary while a parent lives who can act as guardian 
under § 75-13-18. 
In Gallegos vs. City of Midvale, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P. 2d 1335 (1972), the 
Court held that the minority of the two-year old plaintiff did not toll the statute Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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requiring notification to the city within thirty days of injury on its sidewalks. 
court focused its decision on the fact that the infant's interest was assumed to hf 
protected by her parents. In setting forth the grounds for dismissal, the court. 
l 
out: 
It should also be kept in mind that the little girl's welfare 
was being looked after by her parents as her natural guardians. 
They were as fully aware of her injuries and the cause thereof as 
if it had happened to one of themselves, and they could have pro-
ceeded earlier ... Gallegos, supra, at 1338. (Emphasis added) 
A later Utah case dealing with a different statutory right of suit in conflict 
the minority tolling provisions of§ 78-12-36 is Greenhalgh vs. Payson City, SJ; 
799 (Utah 1975). As in Gallegos (which was cited with approval), the infant pl!.: 
was in the active care of its parents during the period of time in which the statut 
of limitations ran and could have proceeded during the critical time. Because th< 
failed to take the action necessary to give the required notice to the city, the cou: 
held the minor was barred from maintaining an action after the statute of lirnitatio· 
found in the governmental Immunity Act had run. 
In a third action against a governmental agency, Varoz vs. Sevey, 506 P .. 
435, 29 Ut.2d 158 (1973) the court held that the minority of the four year oldinfa: 
plaintiff did not toll the statute of limitations. In setting forth the rational for its 
holding, the court stressed the fact that the guardian ad litem was aware of thew 
for filing the statutory notice, yet failed to file in a timely manner with the prope: 
entity. 
The most recent Utah opinion dealing with a minor's suit against a ctefendi 
covered by sovereign immunity laws is found in Scott vs. School Board o~ 
School District, 568 P. 2d 7 46 (Utah 1977). In deciding that the minor's claim w 
not barred by the statute of limitations found in Title 63 of the Utah Code' the co~ Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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rationalized that the legislative intent found in an amendment extending the time 
limitations for suits against cities allowed further extentions for suits filed against 
school districts and other governmental entities. 
The amendment at issue allowed minors to sue a city within the time limits 
specified "or within one year after the person reaches the age of majority, whichever 
is longer." §10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (1975, supp.). 
In the Gallegos, Greenhalgh, Varoz, and Scott cases, the court was faced with 
the interplay of relatively short governmental immunity statutes and the general 
tolling provision found in § 78-12-36. The first three decisions clearly held in 
favor of the short statute of limitations involved , rather than the general tolling 
statute. 
The Scott departure from this policy is justified by the Amendment to §10-7-77. 
This extension specifically applied to municipal defendants, but was applied in the 
Scott case by implication to a school board, in an attempt to bootstrap all minor 
plaintiffs into the superior position granted to them only in recoveries against cities. 
The dissent of Justice Crockett concisely points out the first flaw in the majority's 
reasoning: 
"The general rule of statutory construction is that the legislative 
act is intended to mean just what it says. In amending the statute 
relating to cities , and in failing to so enact with respect to other 
public entities, it should be assumed that they intended just what 
they did and no more at 7 49." 
The second major defect with the main opinion of Scott is also revealed in 
the Chief Justice's dissent. The main text states that an action by or against a minor 
requires the appointment of a guardian ad lit em , citing Rule 17 (b) of the utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Rule 17 (b) , however, is not the exclusive method for litigating 
on behalf of a minor. 
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As Justice Crockett notes: 
"Under our law they [parents] need not be appointed as 
guardians, ad litem, or otherwise. § 78-11-6 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, expressly authorizes the father or mother, to act for redress' 
for injury to a child without such an appointment." 
The methods of suing on behalf of a minor as natural guardian parents und, 
§ 78-11-6 and as appointed guardians ad lit ems under Rule 17 (b) are not exclusivf 
or mandatory avenues for recovery, but are alternative routes equally proper for. 
in cases seeking recovery for infants. Skollinsberg vs. Brookover, 484 P .2d 11;· 
26 Ut.2d 45 (1971). 
The practice of parents bringing actions as natural guardians for minors 
without court appointment has been obvious as recently as 1975. In Greenhalgh 
Payson City, supra, the mother of the infant used, in her own behalf for her i* 
and as a natural guardian, on behalf of her minor son Patrick to recover damages 
for his injuries. Though the Greenhalgh case did not involve a wrongful death 
recovery, it did deal with recovery of a claim belonging to the infant, as soughtt 
the natural guardian mother. 
The cases interpreting governmental notice limitations are helpful, but 
not controlling in resolving the present suit against private individuals for wronr 
death. The Utah cases on this issue must be consulted for the court's ultimate 
determination. In this regard, Parmley vs. Pleasant Valley Coal Co. , 228 Pac.Ii 
64 Ut. 125 (Utah 1924). still stands as good law for the principle that there exist 
only one cause of action for recovery on wrongful death which must be pursued 
within the period of limitations if a member of the class allowed to sue can do so. 
In disallowing suit by a posthumas child for the wrongful death of his fatr.· 
the Parmley court cited numerous cases, including Louisville and N. K · C~ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Sanders, supra. The Sanders court interpreted a wrongful death statute similar to 
~
that of Utah. Kentucky law clearly gave the right of recovery to the administrator, 
personal representative or widow of the decedent. The Kentucky court emphasized 
that each person authorized to sue did not possess an individual right and remedy 
of his own, but that there is only one cause of action and, therefore, only one 
recovery. The court explained: 
Here is but one cause of action. The right to sue upon it 
is given to either of three persons ... if in this instance the adminis-
trator had sued , and either recovered or been defeated, it would 
have been a bar to subsequent action by the children. Sanders, 
supra, at 565. 
After analyzing a substantial number of other representative cases, the Utah 
court concluded that the enforcement of the right to recover damages for death 
... may therefore , be conferred on any one or all of the beneficiaries, 
and the enforcement of the right may be limited to one action which 
must be prosecuted for the benefit of all. .. there is but one cause of 
action, and only one action may be maintained. Parmley, supra, at 
562 (Emphasis supplied) 
This statement has not been modified, supplemented or overturned to date 
by the Utah court. It still applies in its entirety to a situation where there is a 
person in being who can act on behalf of an infant plaintiff, or on his own behalf 
on a claim. The case authorities cited by appellants are simply inapplicable because 
they deal with situations in which the statute of limitations was tolled by a disability 
during which time no one was empowered to bring suit for the wrongful death. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent Reynolds raised the statute of limitations in a proper and timely 
manner by citing §78-12-28, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, at his first possible oppor-
tunity in his Motion to Dismiss. He is not barred or estopped from relying on the Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by th  Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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statute as a valid and sufficient defense. 
Appellant Louella R. Bowles was, under Utah law, the general guardian 01 
her five children from the moment of her husband's death on June 24, 1963. The 
single cause of action for wrongful death arose at that time, if it existed at all. T: 
widow was under no disability and was competent to file a suit to recover her darr 
as an heir, for her husband's wrongful death. In addition, Mrs. Bowles thereaft! 
had all of the minor children in her active care. She had the opportunity and the 
right to bring action from that date forward for them as well and her failure to 
initiate a civil action within two years on either her behalf or her children's behi 
clearly bars the single cause of action for wrongful death. 
The argument that Mrs. Bowles should have acted to protect her children's 
interests is strengthened by the fact that she did initiate action for them by filing 
an application with the Industrial Commission in July, 1963. 
The statute of limitations having run, this case should be dismissed. Then 
was not tolled by the minority status of the children of the decedent because plain: 
Louella R. Switzer Bowles could have instituted a suit as parent or natural guardL 
of the said children within the time allowed under Utah law . The judgment of the 
District Court dismissing the complaint of Appellant should be affirmed. No other 
ruling would be consistent with judicial opinions on this particular issue or in 
harmony with legislative policy. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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